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Taking Responsibility Seriously: The Best Interests of the Child and
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Shahar Lifshitz• **

I.

Introduction

Scholars and teachers of family law tend to divide this field into two main subcategories: spousal
law and parent and child law.1
Spousal law regulates the legal relationship between spouses. It includes, inter alia, marriage law
(for example, who may marry whom); the law of the ongoing marriage, i.e. the mutual rights and
duties of the spouses; divorce law; cohabitant law; spousal support and property relations
between spouses.
Parent and child law deals with the relationship between parents and children. It includes inter
alia: the legal definition of parents; the legal rights, duties and responsibilities of parents to their
children (i.e. the duty of the parent to support his child); the boundaries of the State’s
intervention in the parent-child relationship; custody and adoption law. In general, parent-child
law focuses on the parent-child relationship and consequently does not directly regulate the
relationship of the parents inter se. Nonetheless, important components of parent-child law (for
example, support law, custody law and visitation law) do deal with the division of the legal
rights, duties and responsibilities of the parents. In this respect, beyond regulating parent-child
relationships, parent-child law also regulates the relationship between the parents themselves
(called here - joint parents law).
Among modern lawmakers and scholars the prevailing trend is to distinguish between the
ideologies that guide or ought to guide the regulation of the spousal relationship of the parents,
on one hand, and the ideologies that guide the regulation of parenthood, including joint
parenthood, on the other.
In the spousal context, liberal (individualist and private) approaches guide legal regulation.
Consequently, the law is expected to respect each partner’s freedom of contract and the right of
•
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1
This distinction is well-known in legal literature. For example, in the famous Blackstone Commentaries on
the Common Law, separate chapters are devoted to husband and wife law. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND, (A Facsimile of the First Edition of 1765-1769, Chicago,
1979) Parent-child law as a distinct category can also be found in modern family law “text-books”, see, for example,
Stephen M. Cretney et al., PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW (7th ed., 2002) Part V. See also L. J. Harris & L.E.
Teitelbaum, FAMILY LAW (2nd ed, 2000) Part III. See also Pinhas Shiman, FAMILY LAW IN ISRAEL (Vol. 2
1989 ) (in Hebrew).
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each partner to exit unilaterally from spousal ties and obligations. In the parenthood context, the
best interest of the child is the primary consideration. The terminology of parental responsibility
has gradually replaced the concept of parental rights and consequently, in many cases, the
parents' needs, will and interests including their freedom of contract and their right to exit are
subordinate to the best interest of the child.
This article calls for a rethinking of the modern boundaries between the regulation of spousal
relations and the regulation of parenthood, including joint parenthood. My main argument is that
important legal rules that are currently at the core of spousal law possess a dramatic influence on
children’s lives. Thus, I will critique the current legal regulation that limits the influence of the
best interests of the child principle to the regime of law that is currently classified as parent law
but almost completely ignores its application in regimes currently classified as spousal law.
As noted, this article supports broadening the influence of the best-interest principle beyond its
traditional territory (namely, parent-child law). However, we cannot deny that there must be a
substantial difference between the ordinary role of the best interest of the child in the context of
parenthood law (for example, custody law) and its role in the context of spousal law (for
example, divorce law). In the context of parenthood law, the best interest of the child is a
primary or even a paramount consideration which overwhelms the parents’ needs and will. In
contrast, in the context of spousal law, the parents’ rights must also be accorded significant
weight. Consequently, in this article we shall try to find the proper balance between the rights of
the parents and the best interests of the children in different areas of spousal law.
Apart from the theoretical discussion concerning the ideal law, we shall also discuss the current
positive law (state laws and international laws, especially the Convention on the Rights of the
Child). In this context we will criticize legal arrangements that limit the influence of the best
interest of the child principle to the traditional territory of parenthood law. Nonetheless, in the
spirit of Dworkin’s aspiration to present the existing law in its best light,2 I will also try to
suggest interpretations of the existing law that allow us to overcome the current dichotomy
between spousal law and parenthood law. In this context, a unique attention dedicates to the
phrase actions concerning children, which define in which law's area the best interest of the
child should be a primary consideration. We oppose the current rigid dichotomy between
children – parent's law which considered to be actions concerning children in which the best
interest of the child is the primary, if not the only consideration, to spousal law which is not
considered actions concerning children and therefore the interest of the child, is almost
neglected. We suggest replacing this rigid distinction with flexible formulation, which tries to
identify the best interest of the child in different aspect of life and to balance this interest with the
interests of other parties of the family.
In the final section, we return to a theoretical analysis of the tension that exists between parental
responsibilities and spouse’s rights. We conclude by proposing a possible application of the
framework developed in this article to the broader tension that exists between rights and
responsibilities in contemporary society.

2
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II.

Historical Background: The Common Ethos of Traditional Family Law

Traditionally, most Western countries based the legal regulation of the family on a public
approach.3 This approach originated from feudal concepts which perceived the family as a
patriarchal unit.4
Thus, the feudal world was subject to authorities organized in a hierarchical structure. The
hierarchical structure was committed to the view of the whole of human society as one unit. In
feudal society the individual was not viewed as an atomic entity but as part of a whole system of
community and society; a society in which everyone had a predefined role and where all the
participants were mutually committed. The second component of feudal thinking held that in
feudal society the group and not the individual formed the basic entity. Consequently, feudal
society was subdivided into groups and subgroups, each of which was perceived as a hierarchal
unit organized in such a way as to form a microcosm of the larger society.
The feudal family integrated well into the structure of society.5 The family formed a hierarchal
unit. At the head of the family stood the father and subordinated to him were his wife and
children. Family members had well defined roles and well defined obligations with respect to
each other.
Historians usually tag the 11th – 13th centuries as the second feudal period in the history of
Western Europe. In the early 14th century a gradual disintegration of the feudal structure began
and with the collapse of the feudal configuration a general social transformation took place. This
transformation is eloquently presented by Lord Main in his famous depiction of the history of
social evolvement: “The individual is steadily substituted for the family as the unit of which civil
laws take account.”6
However, despite these shifts, for a long time the family continued to be perceived as a unit
rather than as a collection of individuals and the individual members of the family were
subjugated to the family.
In the common law these issues are clearly expressed in the doctrines of unity and merger which
dominate spousal law. Thus, according to the common law, marriage causes the husband and
wife to be viewed merging into one unit. As a result of the union, the legal personality of the
3

See S. Lifshitz, CONTRACTUAL REGULATION OF SPOUSAL RELATIONSHIP IN CIVIL LAW
(thesis toward a Ph.D. degree, Bar Ilan, 5762) Part I Ch. 2-3.
4
See Mark Bloch, FEUDAL SOCIETY (London, 2nd ed., 1965); see also JANET L. DOGLIN, “The Family
in Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt and Beyond”, 82 GEO. L. J. (1994) 1519, 1524 et seq.; Frances E. Olsen,
“The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform”, 96 HARV. L. REV. (1983) 1497, 1513-1514.
5
See Doglin, ibid, ibid; Olsen, ibid , at 1516; Robert Fossier, “The Feudal Era (Eleventh-Thirteenth
Century)” in Andre Burguiere et al. (eds.) HISTORY OF THE FAMILY, (Vol. I, Paris, 1986, Trans. Sarah H.
Tenision, Cambridge, 1996) 407; Bloch, supra note 4 at 123-142. But cf. Lawrence Stone, THE FAMILY SEX
AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500-1800 (abridged edition , New York, 1979). In contrast to scholars who
emphasize the family as a closed unit, Stone emphasizes the vulnerability of a family to external influences in the
Middle Ages. Stone describes the family during this period as an “open lineage family”.
6
See Henry S. Maine, ANCIENT LAW, ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF
SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS (4th America ed. from 10 London ed. New York, 1906) 1.

6

wife merges with that of her husband and consequently she looses her legal status, her control
over her assets and most of her legal capacity. The law relates to the consolidated unit.7 The
unitary nature of Western spousal law is manifested in the severe restrictions imposed on divorce
as well as the fact that even following dissolution of marriage the link between the parties is not
completely severed as the husband’s obligation to pay alimony to his wife continues to apply.8
The family hierarchical structure has also influenced the evolution of parent-child law. Thus,
parents possessed quasi-property rights in their children.9 These rights enabled the parents to
dominate their children’s lives. 10 Consequently, it was clear that children could not lead their
lives as autonomous beings. On the contrary, children were expected to obey their parents11 and
indeed the ability of the parents to shape their children’s lives continued even when they
matured.12
In the beginning of the 19th century, spousal laws were influenced by a process favoring
individualism. This trend was most prominently expressed in legislation enacted in the United
7

This is how Blackstone describes the theory:
“By marriage the husband and wife are ‘one person in law’ that is the very being or legal existence of the woman is
suspended during the marriage or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband”. See
Blackstone supra note 1, at 430.
There is a large volume of literature which describes the doctrine and its ramifications for women. For a
discussion of this doctrine in the context of English law, see, for example, Brenda Hoggett, “Ends and Means: The
Utility of Marriage as a Legal Institution” in MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIETIES (Toronto, John M Elkelaar & Stanford N Kaats eds., 1980) 94, 195, and the references in note 8. For
the doctrine in the United States, see Hendrik Hartog, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA - A HISTORY (Cambridge,
2000) 103-107 & 115-117.
8
See Lawrence Stone, ROAD TO DIVORCE - ENGLAND 1530-1987 (1990); John Witte, FROM
SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE RELIGION AND LAW IN WESTERN TRADITION (Louisville,
1997).
9
See Mary A. Mason, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS ( Cambridge 1994);
John M. Eekelaar, “The Emergence of Children’s Rights” 6 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES (1986)
161; Florence Kaslow, “Children who Sue Parents” in FAMILY IN TREATMENT: THE POST LAUNCHING
YEARS 351-352.
10
See John Demos, A LITTLE COMMONWEALTH: FAMILY LIFE IN PLYMOUTH COLONY (London,
1975) 100 et seq.; Jean L. Flandrin, FAMILIES IN FORMER TIMES: KINSHIP HOUSEHOLD AND
SEXUALITY (Cambridge, Richard Southren, Trans., 1979) 131-140; Steven Ozment, WHEN FATHER RULED
FAMILY: LIFE IN REFORMATION EUROPE (Cambridge, 1983). At the same time it should be noted that
concurrently with the recognition of the father’s control of his children, this period saw the beginning of the
development – at least in Protestant countries – of ideas concerning parents’ obligations towards their children
particularly to support and educate them.
11
See BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND, (4th ed. 1770) Book1 Ch. 15
sec. 2.
12
Thus, for example, there were places in which family laws in the past vested parents with the right of veto
over their offspring’s choice of spouse, out of the need to protect family estates. Note that the legal requirement of
parental involvement in the marriage ceremony persisted in various countries in Europe through to the end of the
18th century! See, for example, Mary A. Glendon, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE LAW
AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE (Chicago, 1989) 35-36. Even the
Napoleonic Code of 1804 contained a requirement of parental consent for the marriage of young persons (men under
the age of 25 and women under the age of 21) and the obligation to consult with parents prior to marriage even when
the couple involved was above that age. For this, see Dagmar Coester-Waltjen & Michael Coester, “Formation of
Marriage” in “Persons and the Family”, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Mary
Ann Glendon ed., 1997, Vol. IV, Chap. 3) 16-17.
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States and in the United Kingdom repealing the doctrine of merger between the respective legal
personalities of the husband and wife. The repeal of the doctrine meant that married women
could acquire and manage their own property, sue, be sued, enter into contracts and engage in
business activities.13
In the field of parenthood law the trend towards individualism began even earlier, towards the
end of the 18th century. In this period lawmakers understood that the child was not the property
of his parents. Consequently, parents’ rights were interpreted as a legal device for enabling the
parents to act in the best interest of their children.14
However, despite these changes, until the beginning of the 20th century the public, unitary and
non-egalitarian approach continued to characterize family law.15
It seems that the common ethos of spousal law and parenthood law was the basis for the coherent
regulation of the family relationship. Thus, for example, the hierarchical approach created a
familial role based on gender. These legal-familial roles influenced both spousal law and parentchild law. Consequently, in the context of spousal law the husband had the duty to provide for
his wife while the wife had the duty to obey her husband. In the same spirit, in the context of
parent-child law the husband had the duty to provide for his children while the mother had the
duty to take care of the children at home and the law also preferred mothers in custody disputes.
The unit approach also had an impact on spousal law and parenthood law.
The influence of unit ideology on both areas of family law may be exemplified by the “nonintervention in the family” doctrine. Until recently, this doctrine dominated family law and
reflected the perception of the family as an autonomous entity. 16 The doctrine prevented
individuals who made up the family unit (namely, spouses and children) from realizing their
legal rights during the marriage even when these legal rights were violated by a stronger family
member (as usually happened in cases of domestic violence). It is clear, therefore, that this
doctrine reflected the preference accorded to the family unit over the rights of the individuals
who constitute that unit.
13

For this development in the United States, see; Lawrence M. Friedman, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LAW (New York, 2nd ed, 1985) 208-211; Carl N. Degler, AT ODDS - WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN
AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT (Oxford, 1980) 332 et seq. For similar developments
in England see R. H. Graveson, “The Background of the Century” in A CENTURY OF FAMILY LAW 1857-1957
(London, R.H. Graveson & F. R. Crane eds., 1957) 1, 15-17.
14
John M. Eekelaar, “From ‘Privacy’ to the Leviathan State; The Case of the Child”, THE EUROPEAN
FAMILY - THE FAMILY QUESTION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, (Jacques Commaille & Francois de
Singly eds., 1997) 205 (hereafter: Eekelaar - Leviathan); see also Kaslow, supra note 9, at 352-354; as well as John
M. Eekelaar, “Families and Children: From Welfarism to Rights” in INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE LAW IN
BRITAIN (ed. Mccrudden & Chambers )301, 323-332(hereafter: Eekelaar Welfarism).
15
See Witte, supra note 7 at 203-204; Harry Willekens, “Long Term Development in Family Law in Western
Europe: An Explanation” in THE CHANGING FAMILY: FAMILY FORMS & FAMILY LAW (Oxford, John
Eekelaar & Thandabantu Nhlapo eds., 1998) 47, 50-51; Lifshitz, supra note 3, chapter 3 section 7, all of whom
emphasize the similarities between family laws in the beginning of the 20th century and family laws in the 16th
century.
16
For this doctrine and its influence on spousal law and parenthood law, see Frances E. Olsen, “The Myth of
State Intervention in The Family”, 18 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 835 (1985); Frances E. Olsen, “The Family and the
Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform”, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983); see also Eekelaar (Leviathan),
supra note 14; Eekelaar (Welfarism), supra note 14 at 311-312 and Kaslow, supra note 9 at 353.
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The unit approach also impacted both areas of family law in the context of the limitations
imposed on individual rights to exit from family ties. Thus, divorce law dramatically limited the
ability of the spouses to dissolve the marriage 17 and in any event no divorce was absolute due to
the economic obligation of the ex-husband to support his children18 and his ex-wife 19after the
divorce.
The public aspect of family regulation also reflected the similarities between the regulation of the
spousal relationship and the regulation of parenthood. Thus, both spousal law and parent-child
law formed part of the public “agenda” aimed at channelling people into the framework of
marriage.20 In this context traditional spousal law denied any legal rights to unmarried
cohabitees.21 Parent-child law also participated in the struggle to channel people into marriage
and children born out of wedlock were considered to be illegitimate.22 It is clear, therefore, that
according to traditional family law, beyond the influence exerted by the spousal relationship of
the parents on their own mutual rights and obligations, the spousal relationship also exerted an
influence on their definition as parents! The spousal relationship influenced the definition of a
person as a parents in other respects as well: According to traditional law a legal presumption
existed to the effect that the husband was the father of children born to his wife during the
marriage. This presumption remained valid even when it was clear in the circumstance that the
husband was not the biological father. 23
The “public attitude” to family issues contributed to the blurring of the boundaries between the
regulation of the spousal relationship and the regulation of parenthood in yet another respect.
One of the outstanding implications of the “public approach” lay in making the concept of
“fault” relevant to family issues. According to traditional law, public evaluation of spousal
behavior had legal implications.24 Consequently, the ability to get divorced and the economic
consequences of the divorce were based on the fault model. Moreover, the classification of a
spouse as the guilty party affected his chances of becoming the custodian parent.25 This meant
17

See R. Phillips, “Putting Asunder: A History of Divorce in Western Society” (Cambridge, 1998) 403-478;
and S.M. Cretney, J.M. Masson & R. Bailey-Harris, PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW (London, 7th ed. 2002) 269271.
18
See Cretney, Masson & Bailey-Harris, ibid at et seq.
19
Margaret F. Brining & June R. Carbone, “The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce”, 62 TUL. L.
REV (1988) 855; Cretney, Masson & Bailey-Harris, ibid, at 341-342; Glendon, supra note12, at 197-207; I.M.
Ellman, “The Theory of Alimony”, 77 CAL. L. REV. (1989).
20
For the channeling function of family law, see Carl E. Schneider, “The Channeling Function in Family
Law”, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495 (1992).
21
See Glendon, supra note 12, at 252-254.
22
See Willekens, supra note 15, 48–50; M. Grossberg, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE
FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (Chapel Hill, G. E. White ed., 1985) Ch. 7.
23
See Traci Dallas, “Rebutting the Marital Presumption: A Developed Relationship Test”, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 369, at 370-371. (The marital presumption was known as 'Lord Mansfield’s Rule' and provided that a
woman’s husband was the father of all children born during the marriage. This presumption was based on notions of
morality and decency). See also S.M Cretney, J.M. Masson & R. Bailey-Harris ,supra note 17, 524 and the famous
case of Michael H. v. Gerald D. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
24
Traditional divorce law enabled only the innocent spouse to sue for divorce and to obtain alimony, see R.
Phillips, supra note 17. 403-478;
25
See Altman Scott, “Should Child Custody Rules be Fair?” 35. U. OF LOUISVILLE OF FAM. L. 325
(1996) 333.
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that spousal behavior legally classified as “faulty conduct” had crucial implications not only in
the context of spousal law but also in the context of parenthood law.
To summarize, despite the general recognition of the division of family law into spousal law and
parenthood law, traditional law integrated the regulation of the two fields. Consequently, spousal
relations and conduct had dramatic implications for the regulation of the relationships between
parents and spouses and even on the legal definition of a person as a parent.

III.

From Partner to Parents: The Modern Distinction Between Parenthood
and Spousal Law

A. The Individualization of Modern Family Law
Western family law was dramatically transformed during the second half of the 20th
century.26 In this period the conservative, unit, non egalitarian ethos was replaced by a liberal,
individualistic, egalitarian ethos. The trend that evolved was one which deprived the family unit
of its legal significance.27 Accordingly, the law treated the individual not as a member of a
family but as an autonomous entity,28 who had the capacity and the right to create ties, determine
their substance and ultimately rescind them.
This liberal-individualistic trend is today reflected in almost all aspects of modern spousal laws.
29

Entry into marriage is based upon decisions of individuals30and is not subjugated (as it was in the
past) to the limitations and needs of the original family unit; the “independent” status of the
partners is preserved even after the marriage. In this framework, rules which established special
26

For the dramatic changes which took place to spousal laws in the second half of the 20th century, see
Glendon 1989, supra note 12; Lifshitz, supra note 3, Ch. 4;
27
See Glendon, ibid, at 102-103. In summary, we have noted the emergence of new legal images of the
family which to varying degrees stress the separate personalities of the family members rather than the unitary
aspect of the family. See also Frances E. Olsen, “The Politics of Family Law”, 2 LAW & INEQ. J. (1984) 1, 8.
According to Olsen the change is “from the family as a corporate unit to the family as a voluntary association of
individuals”. See also Elizabeth S. Scott, “Rehabilitation Liberalism and Modern Divorce”, UTAH L. REV. (1994)
687.
28
See Salvatore Patti, “Intra-Family Torts”, PERSONS AND THE FAMILY - INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 7 (Mary Ann Glendon ed., Vol. IV, Ch.9, 1998) at 437,
29
A description of the changes in modern spousal laws in the terminology of individualization is well
accepted in Western literature, see, for example, Stephen J. Morse, “Family Law in Transition: From Traditional
Families to Individual Liberty” in CHANGING IMAGES OF THE FAMILY (New Haven, Virginia Tufte &
Barbara G., eds., 1979) 319, 320-322; Marjone M. Shultz, “Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for
State Policy”, 70 CAL. L. REV. (1982) 204, 275-280; Martha Minow, “’Forming Underneath Everything that
Grows’ Toward History of Family Law”, 1985 WIS. LAW REV. 819, 833; Jana B. Singer, “The Privatization of
Family Law”, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1462-1465; Doglin, supra note 4, at 1553; Anne C. Dailey, “Constitutional
Privacy and the Just Family”, 67 TUL. L. REV. (1993) 955, 972-978; Martha A. Fineman, THE ILLUSION OF
EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (Chicago, 1991) 18.
30
For these trends in the United States, see Singer, ibid, at 1465-1470. For a review of the trends in central
Western countries in this connection, see Glendon, supra note 12, at 33-75, as well as Lynn D. Wardle,
“International Marriage and Divorce Regulation and Recognition: A Survey”, 29 FAM. L. Q. (1996) 497, 500-502.
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consequences for marriages have been cancelled, so that in many cases the legal status of the
partners with respect to one another is one of two independent individuals having no special
bond.31
This “individualistic” arrangement is manifest, in particular, in modern divorce laws: the ease of
divorce and especially the transition to divorce on demand. The significance of this is that
individuals now have the right to sever themselves from the family framework.32 In the United
States a number of decisions of the Supreme Court are interpreted as conferring constitutional
status upon this right.33 The commitment to individualistic principles is also reflected in the
“clean-break principle”34 which states that upon divorce there is an obligation to completely
sever the partners’ mutual economic obligations.
The individualistic trend also influences parent-child law. Consequently, during the 20th century
the traditional approaches that perceived the father as the owner of the children or as an
autonomous leader were abandoned. 35 The modern alternative is to prohibit an instrumental
attitude toward children with the result that the best interest of the child, which emphasizes the
status of the child as autonomous individual, has become the primary consideration in the
regulation of parenthood. 36 Furthermore, while the unit approach inspired the non–intervention
31

Singer, ibid, at 1465 and Lifshitz, supra note 3 at chapter 4 section 3.3 c).
In the words of Justice Brennan in Eisenstadt v. Baird 405 U.S. 438 (1972) at 453:
“It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is
not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a
separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person.”
32
See Wardle supra note 30 at 51, “clearly the contract terminated at will by either spouse model of marriage
(defined by no fault divorce laws) is the dominant model of marriage in the world today”. See also Valerio Pocar &
Palona Ronfani, “From Institution to Self-Regulation” in THE EUROPEN FAMILY: THE FAMILY QUESTION
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (Dordrecht, Jacques Commaile & Francois de Singly eds., 1997) 195, 196
(these authors identify the same trends in Europe). The trend towards easing divorce laws is also identified by
Glendon 1989, supra note 39 at 148-197.
33
See Cathy J. Jones, “The Rights to Marry and Divorce: A New Look at Some Unanswered Questions”, 63
WASH. U.L. Q (1985) 577.
34
For the establishment of the clean-break principle as a supra-principle, to which the no-fault divorce
process must aspire, see Herma H. Kay, “An Appraisal of California’s No-Fault Divorce Law”, 75 CAL. L. REV.
(1987) 291, 313. This principle is also recognized by the case law in various Western countries, see, for example,
Turner v. Turner 385 A.2d 1280, 1281. (N.J., 1978) “The law should provide both parties with the opportunity to
make a new life…”; see also the comments of the Canadian Judge Wilson in the well-known case Pelech v. Pelech 7
Rfl (3d) 225, 271 (Scc), “To burden the respondent with her care … for no other reason than that they were once
husband and wife seems to me to create a fiction of marital responsibility at the expense of individual responsibility.
I believe that the courts must recognize the right of the individual to end a relationship as well as begin one and
should not, when all other aspects of the relationship have long since ceased, treat the financial responsibility as
continuing indefinitely into the future.” See further the remarks of Lord Scarman in the case of Minton v. Minton
[1979] AC 593, 608, who described the clean break principle and the couple’s desire to turn their back on the past
and start a new life, as fundamental elements of modern alimony laws.
35
See John M. Eekelaar, “The Emergence of Children’s Rights”, 6 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL
STUDIES (1986) 161; Eekelaar (Leviathan), supra note 14;. Mason, supra note 9.
36
See Philip Alston (ed.), THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: RECONCILING CULTURE AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (Oxford 1994); Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud & Albert. J. Solnit, BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (New-York, 1979). See also Joseph Goldstein, Albert J. Solnit & Anna Freud, THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE (New York, 1996).
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doctrine which prevented children from suing their parents and even denied them the protection
of criminal law, modern family law has shown a much greater readiness to intervene in family
matters when such intervention is needed to protect children. 37
The modern discourse on children rights38 is a discrete example of the individualistic nature of
parent-child law. This discourse is based on a perception of the child as an autonomous entity
who is entitled to general human rights and to unique rights which are connected to his needs as
a child. 39 Furthermore, in contrast to the paternalistic nature of the best interest of the child
principle which enables adults to manage the child’s life, the rights discourse emphasizes the
importance of the participation of the child in decisions connected to his life-style and
direction.40 It is clear, therefore, that this is an individualistic discourse which emphasizes that
the parents and their child are separate entities.41 Against this background even the right to exit
which dominates modern spousal law influences parent-child law and consequently some
western cases deal with children who want to divorce themselves from their parents.42

B. The opposite direction of Parent-Child Law and Spousal Law
There can be no doubt that a basic resemblance exists between the process of liberalization and
individualization which affected parent-child law and spousal law respectively in the 20th
century. Nonetheless, in this section I shall consider these issues from a different perspective
which exposes the tension between the processes occurring in these two spheres. I shall refer to a
number of ways in which the process of liberalization and individualization of spousal law has
taken a divergent course to developments in parent-child laws.
37
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i) Independence Versus Responsibility
In the area of spousal relations, the significance of individualization and the approach which
regards each partner as an autonomous individual has been to lessen the mutual commitments
and responsibilities of the spouses both during marriage and following its dissolution. 43 In
contrast, the modern attitude towards the child as an autonomous being has not had the result of
diminishing parental responsibilities and commitments towards the child. On the contrary, the
attitude of modern law regarding the best interest of the child as the fundamental principle of
parent-child law and recognition of the rights of the child has imposed extremely important
obligations on parents towards their children. 44 Moreover, whereas in the area of spousal law,
modern law emphasizes the separateness of the partners, modern scholar, like Minow45, Haften46
and Ronenn,47 claim that one of the basic rights of the child is the right to a relationship, with his
parents and to the sense of belonging to a family. Beyond the writing of scholar, I should add that
Articles 8-9 of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, can be interpreted in that
direction. .This right falls outside the narrow individualistic approach and requires the adoption
of a relational attitude in the context of parent-child relations. The difference in individualistic
trends between parent-child law and spousal law has been expressed in the use of the rights
dialogue. Whereas in the context of spousal relations, the rights dialogue characterizes the
symmetric relations of the couple, there is a lack of symmetry in the use of this dialogue in the
context of parent-child relations. On one hand, in so far as concerns child-parent relations in
many cases modern law equips the children with legal rights against their parents, on the other
hand, in so far as concerns parent-child relations, many western systems of law have adopted the
term “parental responsibilities” as the term suitable for the legal connection between parents and
their children. 48 Even though in some countries49 the term “parental responsibilities” also
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includes certain parental rights50 (principally vis-à-vis the State), as a rule the term in fact
emphasizes the commitments of the parents towards their children and their best interest.51

ii) Public Regulation Versus Freedom of Contract
Another difference between the modern trends in spousal law and parent-child law is connected
to the tension between private ordering and public regulation.
Until recently, the family relationship was dominated by massive public regulation. The State
rather than the parties decided the legal content of the relationship and freedom of contract was
not recognized.52 In contrast to traditional regulation, prominent researchers in the field of
family law have now identified processes of deregulation and privatization53 occurring in modern
western spousal law. The modern law has extended the freedom of contract of the spouse to
regulate his spousal relationship and, in general, the law now prefers private ordering to public
regulation.54 Indeed, according to some opinions, modern legislators should shape spousal law
in the light of contractual values55 (e.g. fulfilment of the explicit and implicit will of the parties)
so that in the long run contract law will replace family law.56
In contrast to trends favouring privatization and freedom of contract characterizing spousal law,
it is very difficult to characterize parent-child laws in a similar way. On the contrary, whereas
entry into a spousal relationship is based on the consent of the parties and their free will, a person
may have to undertake the commitments of a parent even when he did not desire the child. 57
Accordingly, contrary to the trend seeking to structure spousal law on the basis of the assumed
intentions of the parties, in the area of parent-child relations, the commitment of the parents to
act in the best interest of the child is of a coercive character, and is not intended to reflect the
49
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desire or the assumed consent of the parents. 58 Likewise, contrary to freedom of contract which
is at the core of the modern model of spousal law, the minority of the children, the interest in
ensuring their welfare, and the character of parent-child relations generally, 59 make it very
difficult to contractually regulate the relations between parents and their children, without public
oversight.

iii) The Right to Exit
The discrepancy between the trends in spousal law and parent-child law becomes dramatic in the
context of ending the relationship.
As we have seen the liberal-individualistic “right to exit” dominates spousal law. Consequently,
not only does spousal law enable both parents to agree on ending the relationship but it also
enables unilateral divorce.60 In contrast, in spite of the fact that in some circumstance the law
enables children to obtain a “divorce” from their parents it is clear that parents cannot obtain a
divorce from their children.61 Furthermore, despite the fact that the can't enforce parents to love
their children or to be a good parents by specific performance order, In the modern law there are
sever legal result to extremely bad parenthood62.
A similar distinction between spousal law and parent-child law arises in connection with the
regulation of the economic relations between members of the family following divorce. In the
context of spousal law we have seen that whereas in the past the obligation to pay alimony
prevented the absolute severance of the mutual economic responsibilities of the parties even in
the case of divorce, modern divorce laws have weakened this obligation. We have explained that
this aspect of divorce laws is connected to the ideology of a “clean break” at the core of which
lies the desire to enable an absolute severing of the economic bond so as to allow the couple to
begin a new life. 63 The situation is different in as far as concerns the economic commitment of
parents towards their children. Indeed, in the past, as part of the ideology supporting a clean
break and the need of divorced parents to begin a fresh life, an express or implicit trend
58
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developed supporting the weakening of the duty of maintenance of parents (in particular fathers
towards their children). 64 However, this trend has been reversed, and today as part of the
commitment towards the dual principles of the best interest and the rights of the child, many
countries invest considerable effort in expanding and enforcing the duty of maintenance of
parents towards their children. 65 In this sense, parent-child law is an exception to the regular
liberal commitment to freedom to sever relations and obligations and the desire of modern family
law to create convenient conditions for a new start in life.

C. From Partners to Parents
From the analysis of the developments which took place in the second half of the 20th century it
clearly follows that a fundamental shift has taken place in family law from regulation focusing
on the spousal relationship to regulation focusing on parental relationships.
In the spousal area, it is possible to discern a weakening of the legal commitment imposed on a
person by reason of his spousal relations, to the extent that the law enables partners to initiate
and achieve unilateral severance. In a similar context, the law prefers private ordering over
public regulation. On a more general level, the legal importance of the spousal pattern in which a
person lives been weakened, as many rights and many rights granted in the past solely to married
persons, are today also granted to cohabitees and even to families which are not based on spousal
relations (for example one-parent families). 66 In contrast, while parent-child relations have also
undergone an individualistic process which emphasizes the autonomy of children, this process
has not led to the weakening of parental responsibilities towards children and/or to a lessening of
the public legal regulation of parent-child relations. On the contrary, in this area it is possible to
discern an expansion of parental responsibility to realize the rights of their children, the freedom
of parents to engage in contractual arrangements is still limited and certainly the law does not
recognize the possibility of a parent unilaterally severing his connection to his child. Moreover,
contrary to the past, modern law defines the parental connection, including responsibility, rights
and the ensuing obligations, on the basis of the connection between the parent and child without
reference to the spousal pattern in which the parents lived.67
Thus, contrary to the weakening of the importance of the spousal relationship, modern law
attaches huge importance to the connection between a parent and his child. Accordingly, there is
massive legal regulation of parent-child relations. At the heart of this regulation lie the best
interest of the child and the realization of his rights. Against this background there are those who
see the shift from partners to parents as a process characterizing modern family law. 68
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D. The Need to Distinguish Between Spousal Law and Joint Parent's Law
Some radical feminists attack the traditional stance that describes both parents and children as
the basic unit of the family. They think that the law must focus on what they call the dyad
relationship between children and their primary caretakers (in most cases mothers).69 However,
most law makers still think that even in cases in which the parents live separately the non–
custodian parent has an important role, authority and responsibility towards his child.
Consequently, in cases in which there are problems in the relationship of the parents, for
example, when they are not living together, parent-child law – beyond regulating children-parent
relationships – will deal also with the mutual relationship between the parents themselves (called
here - joint parents law)70.
These aspects of parenthood law challenge the current direction of spousal law. On one hand,
the aspiration of spousal law is to afford the spouses the opportunity to manage their life and
their separation, by private ordering, and consequently the courts are expected to respect the
freedom of contract of the spouses. On the other hand, the public character of parenthood law
means that the court must supervise the parents’ agreement in the light of their responsibilities
towards their child and in accordance with the “best interest” principle. The exit question also
raises another tension. On one hand, it is the aspiration of spousal law to enable each spouse to
end completely his legal relationship and obligations upon divorce (the clean break principle).
On the other hand, the continued responsibility of both parents toward their children means that
the economic and personal ties between the parents cannot be severed on divorce.
What is the solution for the tension between the desire of spousal law to deregulate spousal
relations and enable them to sever their ties completely following divorce and the need of parentchild law to supervise the joint parenthood of ex-spouses, including restricting their ability to
perform such a clean break? It would seem that the answer may be found in the question itself.
Modern law must draw a clear and unequivocal distinction between the parental and spousal
dimensions of the parties’ relations. In so far as concerns the spousal dimension of the relations,
it is necessary to continue pursuing the individualistic contractual trends. In contrast, in so far as
concerns the parental dimension of the parties’ relations it would be right to restrict these trends
in accordance with considerations relating to the best interests of the child. Thus, whereas the
common ethos which characterized the traditional regulation of parent-child law and spousal law
enabled a coherent regulation of the relations of spouses who were parents, the tension between
the trends in the two spheres of modern law require a sharp distinction to be drawn between
regulation of the spousal dimension of parent relations and regulation of their joint parenthood.
According to this view, in contrast to the past where the spousal conduct and the spousal pattern
of the parents influenced the regulation of their parenthood, today regulation of parenthood,
including regulation of joint parenthood, is an independent matter which is not contingent upon
the conduct of the spouses or the spousal pattern in which they lived. 71
69
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IV. Spousal Law and Parenthood Law: Rethinking the Distinction
A. Background
From the point of view of the best interest of the child, great importance attaches to the modern
distinction between parenthood law and spousal law and the derivative distinction between the
spousal aspect of the parties’ relationship and the regulation of their joint parenthood.
First, the traditional approach which defined legal parenthood according to the spousal pattern of
the parents was shaped in a sociological context in which, in the vast majority of cases, children
were born and raised within wedlock. In contrast, today, many children are born and raised
outside marriage and occasionally even without the parents being in a firm relationship.72
Accordingly, in the modern world, the significance of a legal rule which defines parenthood in
accordance with the nature of the relationship between the spouses may lead to the rescission of
legal recognition of the relationship between many fathers and their children.73 Such a move
would mean absence of recognition of these fathers’ parental responsibility towards their
children. Releasing fathers from their duties towards their children may harm the children
financially and emotionally.74 In this context there is a clear rationale for the modern approach
which defines the parental bond, including responsibilities, rights and duties derived from it, on
the basis of the connection between the parent and child without regard for the spousal pattern of
the parents.75
Second, the division between regulation of parenthood and regulation of partnerships protects
children in that it clarifies to the lawmakers that the individualistic – private attitude to spousal
relations is not applicable to joint parenthood. Hence, arrangements between parents on parental
matters continue to be subject to public oversight which focuses on the best interest of the
child.76 Similarly, the division between regulation of partnerships and regulation of parenthood
promotes the best interest of children in that it clarifies that the modern aspiration to sever the
relations which are detached from joint parental relations. Note, however, that Frantz & Dagan’s theory regarding
partnership has clear joint communitarian aspects which differ from individualistic contractual trends characteristic
of modern spousal laws.
72
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relations between divorced spouses is inapplicable on the parental level. Moreover, legal rules in
general, and family law rules in particular, influence social norms and consequently the behavior
and even the preferences of people.77 Consequently, I believe that the distinction between
partnerships and parenthood contributes to the spouses’ understanding that spousal crises and
divorce cannot terminate their continued joint parental responsibilities.78
Nonetheless, notwithstanding that the modern changes in family law support the importance of
the distinction between the regulation of partnerships and regulation of parenthood, in this
chapter I wish to argue that this distinction and its ramifications ought to be reconsidered. My
fundamental contention is that occasionally the distinction between spousal behavior and
parental behavior is artificial as in many cases spousal behavior has dramatic repercussions for
the lives of children. I shall also argue that even in the legal context there is great difficulty in
defining the boundaries between spousal laws and parental laws, as laws which are usually
classified as spousal laws may have an influence on the interests and rights of children.
Accordingly, confining the influence of the principle of the best interest of the child to what is
classified today as parent-child law may cause great hardship from the point of view of the best
interest of the child. In view of this approach, I shall propose the adoption of a normative regime
which sees the best interest of the child as the guiding principle not only of parent-child laws but
also of what is classified as spousal laws. I shall consider the need to identify new balancing
formulae between the best interest of the child and the needs of the parents in areas dealt with by
this study. I shall illustrate the possible application of the proposed approach in a number of
important issues dealt with by family law.

B.

The Challenge: The Need of Modern Individual Spousal law to Consider
the Best Interest of the Child

Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides as follows:
“1.

In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”
(My emphasis – S.L.)

As mentioned earlier, spousal laws deal with the regulation of partnerships and therefore they
focus on spousal behaviour. In contrast, parent-child law deals with the regulation of relations
between parents and children and therefore it focuses on parental conduct. Conceivably, it is
because of this that the principle of the best interest of the child is perceived as the guiding
principle of parent-child law even though its influence on spousal law is minimal.
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Nonetheless, as will be explained in more detail below, in real life situations, in contrast to legal
theory, the distinction between spousal behaviour and parental behaviour is not an easy one to
make as “spousal” conduct has an apparent impact on the lives of children. Accordingly, legal
regulation of spousal relations which focuses on the spouses and their conduct but which fails to
take into account the best interest of their children may ultimately harm the children.
Despite this, in legal discourse, it is customary to deal with the principle of the best interest of
the child and its significance primarily in the traditional contexts of parent-child laws such as
issues of custody, medical treatment, adoption, education, fostering and the like, albeit this
restriction does not arise from the language of the convention or from its rationale.79 On the
contrary, the article emphasizes that in “all actions concerning children” the best interests of the
child shall be a primary consideration. Under the convention, the best interest of the child is a
primary consideration in the legal regulation of these matters.
At the same time, while in relation to decisions which patently deal with children such as
custody or education, it is possible to justify an approach making the best interest of the child a
primary consideration and in certain circumstances even a paramount consideration which
overrides other considerations including the interests and desires of the parents, it seems to me
that even the most fervent supporters of the principle of the best interest of the child would find it
difficult to justify the complete discounting of the desires and rights of the parents in relation to
manifestly spousal matters such as the continuation of the partnership or division of property
accumulated during the marriage. Thus, in relation to the latter issues, I do not believe that it is
possible to attribute to the principle of the best interest of the child a status similar to that given
to this principle in relation to issues dealing directly with children. At the same time, in view of
the analysis which refers to the ramifications of spousal behaviour on the lives of children, the
regulation of spousal relations which has an impact on children’s lives must take into account
considerations of the best interest of the child concurrently with other customary considerations.
At least in some cases, considerations of the best interest of the child and the obligations to
children deriving from these considerations may clash with the contractual, private
individualistic approach which currently characterizes spousal laws.
Thus, the recognition of the far-reaching influence which spousal behaviour has for the legal
regulation of the best interests of the child creates a difficult challenge for jurists committed to
liberal-contractual-individualistic trends of spousal law, on one hand, and for the status of the
best interest of the child as a supra-principle, on the other hand. I am not convinced that in this
study I can propose a general comprehensive formula for the integration of considerations
relating to the best interest of the child within the framework of spousal laws. Nonetheless,
below, I shall still propose a number of ways in which such considerations may be integrated in
spousal laws in relation to a number of specific issues usually dealt with by these laws (divorce
laws, property relations, accommodation laws and attitudes towards spousal agreements). As we
shall see, a cautious analysis of considerations relating to the best interest of the child on one
hand and the interests and desires of the parents on the other hand, shows that at least in some of
the cases it is possible to propose acceptable balancing mechanisms between the interests and
79
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desires of the parents and the needs and welfare of the children. Applying the balancing formula
proposed here, we shall examine some of the regulations used in the legal systems of various
countries and in some of the cases we shall propose interpretations of these regulations combined
with the principle of the best interest of the child. In other cases we shall conclude that it is
necessary to amend the existing law.

C.

The Normative Implication
i

Divorce on Demand and Child Considerations

Divorce laws expressively illustrate the modern trend towards distinguishing between spousal
laws and parental laws and the decreasing importance of child considerations in the modern
understanding of partnership and its laws.
In the past, the legal and moral expectations of society were that spouses would overcome
differences of opinions and refrain from divorce ‘for the sake of the children’.
This expectation faltered in the second half of the 20th century when the legal attitude towards
divorce was primarily spousal. It was argued that while the divorce of parents indeed severed a
considerable portion of the bond and the legal responsibilities between the parents it did not
sever the legal bond and responsibilities between the parents and their children80.Thus, in the
spirit of the general distinction between spousal laws and parental laws, a distinction developed
between the divorce itself – which concerned the relations between the parents – and some of the
consequences of the divorce, for example, custody of children and maintenance of children,
which were concerned with the continued responsibility of parents for their children. This spirit
of individualism which guided the spousal laws shaped the divorce laws; the resulting trend was
the dramatic facilitation of the spouses or even one of them to initiate a divorce to the extent that
some observers described the model of divorce on demand as the dominant model in the modern
approach towards divorce laws. In view of the primacy given to the desire of the couple (or one
of them) to divorce, almost no weight at all was given to considerations relating to the best
interest of the child. In practice, even the most fervent supporters of the principle of the best
interest of the child explained that this principle was not to be given primacy when divorce laws,
in their narrow sense, were being deliberated.81
In recent times the status of children affected by divorce disputes has become the subject of
renewed discussion.82 This fresh interest is linked to a series of studies which exposed the long
80

See ,, supra note 9 “Although divorce legally ends a marriage, it cannot dissolve the bond uniting father –
or mother – and child”.
81
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21

term damage caused to children of divorced parents83 and to children in one-parent families in
general.84 The studies showed that children raised under the shadow of divorce are more likely to
suffer from emotional distress, learning difficulties, premature departure from school, early
pregnancy, juvenile crime and future unemployment and relationship problems. In view of these
findings, new opponent of the modern model of divorce on demand claim that divorce law must
be shaped in such a way as to enable the prevention or at least significant postponement of
divorce in order to protect the interests of minor children.85
Prima facie, the analysis exposing the serious problems encountered by children of divorced
parents presents an irreconcilable contradiction between considerations of the welfare of the
child which support making divorce laws more strict and the liberal-individualist ideology which
supports a sharp and clean break. Yet, in my view, a deeper examination of this issue reveals that
the contradiction is not as acute as might seem at first glance and that even considerations of the
welfare of the child do not necessarily support a policy of strict divorce laws.
First, the argument that it is necessary to make divorce laws more stringent because of the
suffering of children of divorced parents, tacitly assumes that stringent divorce laws are likely to
prevent divorces. However, such an argument itself is a matter of intense controversy as many
studies doubt the capacity of divorce laws to reduce the rate of divorces.86
THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE: THE 25 YEAR LANDMARK STUDY. New York: Hyperion.; C.
P. Martinez & M. S. Forgatch (2002), “Adjusting to Change: Linking Family Structure Transitions with Parenting
and Boys Adjustment”, JOURNAL OF FAMILY PSYCHOLOGY, 16 (2) 107-117; M. F. Whiteside & B. S. Becker
(2000), “Parental Factors and the Young Child’s Post Divorce Adjustment: A Meta-Analysis with Implications for
Parenting Arrangements”, JOURNAL OF FAMILY PSYCHOLOGY 14 (1), 5-26; L. Laumann-Billings & , R.E.
Emery (2000), “Distress Among Young Adults from Divorced Families”, JOURNAL OF FAMILY
PSYCHOLOGY, 14 (4), 671-687.
83
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COPE WITH DIVORCE (New York, 1980); J. S. Wallerstein & S. Blakeslee, SECOND CHANCES: MEN,
WOMEN AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE, (New-York, 1989); R. E. Emery, MARRIAGE
DIVORCE AND CHILDREN’S AJUSTMENT (Newbury Park, Cali. 1988); P. R. Amato, “Children’s Adjustment
to Divorce: Theories, Hypotheses and Empirical Support”, 55 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. (1993) 23; P.R. Amato & A.
Booth, A GENERATION AT RISK: GROWING UP IN AN ERA OF FAMILY UPHEAVAL (Cambridge, 1997).
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PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER AND BETTER OF FINANCIALLY (New-York, 2000).
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Decision”, 13 VT. L. REV. (1989) 531; J.T. Younger, “Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and
Demoralization Together with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform”, 67 CORNELL L. REV. (1981) 45, 90 et seq.;
Waite & Gallagher, ibid, at Ch. 9-10, 14; Wardle, supra note 30 at 134; W. Galston, LIBERAL PURPOSE:
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Arguments for Fault Divorce”, 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 719; T. B. Marvell, “Divorce Rates and the Fault Requirement“,
23 L. & SOC. REV. (1989) 543. See also P. A. Nakonezny et al., “The Effect of No-Fault Divorce Law on Divorce
Rate Across the 50 States and its Relation to Income, Education, and Religiosity”, 57 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
(1995) 477; D. W. Allen, “Marriage and Divorce: Comment”, 82 AM. ECON. REV. (1992) 679; L. Friedberg, “Did
Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence from Panel Data”, 88 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

22

Second, even if divorce laws are capable of reducing the legal divorce rate, it is not clear that
strict divorce laws can contend with the sociological phenomenon of divorce, i.e., the separation
of the couple. Many of the problems faced by the children of divorced couples are connected to
the sociological aspect of the divorce and not necessarily to the legal aspect. Accordingly, it is
not clear that a change to the legal regulation would contribute to the welfare of the children.
Third, the harsh findings regarding the special problems of children in families which have
undergone divorce do not necessarily prove that it was the divorce (in its legal and/or
sociological sense) per se which harmed the children. An alternative possibility is certainly
conceivable, namely, that it is the processes which generally accompany a dispute between
parents, and in particular life in homes characterized by harsh disputes87 between the parents,
which cause the difficulties.88 If this is the case, the proposal to make divorce laws more
stringent will not help these children, but on the contrary, will harm them. Lengthening the
divorce process may increase the exposure of the children to tensions between their parents in
the period when these tensions are in fact at their most acute. Accordingly, making divorce laws
more stringent may worsen the problems faced by the children of parents desiring to divorce.89
It should also be emphasized that at least some of those criticizing modern divorce laws attempt
to deal with the assumption that the cause of the distress to children in cases of divorce is not the
divorce itself but the conflict between the couple prior to divorce. For this purpose, new
psychological studies are presented that use complex statistical tools which isolate the influences
of different factors.90 These studies prove that at least in certain cases (for example, homes
characterized by low levels of tension) some of the problems faced by children of divorced
parents are attributable to the divorce itself and not ancillary processes.91 On the face of it,
therefore, an approach focusing on the welfare of the child would support negating the
(1998) 608. Notwithstanding the intensive research, the studies have found it difficult to reach a consensus on this
issue.
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possibility of divorce in such cases. At the same time, in my view, legal rules which would
define certain family situations (for example, low levels of tension between parents) as ones
which negate the possibility of divorce, may encourage partners interested in divorce to act
manipulatively and heighten the family conflict. Accordingly, such rules may ultimately harm
children. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, legal rules will obstruct, or at the most delay, formal
divorce; the ability of divorce laws to prevent substantive divorce, i.e. to prevent the possibility
of separation and severance is much weaker. It seems that even the studies which conclude that
divorces harm children, are addressing divorces in their sociological sense and not the legal
definition of the relations between the parties. Accordingly, I do not believe that a
comprehensive rescission of the right to legal divorce would be an efficient measure even from a
perspective focusing on the welfare of the child.
Earlier I explained why comprehensive denial of divorce is not an appropriate policy from a
point of view focusing on the welfare of the child. At the same time, notwithstanding my
reservations concerning comprehensive denial of the unilateral right to no-fault divorce, it would
seem that the demand to take into account the welfare of children when shaping divorce laws is
certainly valid. I believe that the studies which deal with the influence of divorces on children
clearly show that even if divorces do not invariably harm children,92 the process is a complex
one which has a significant impact on their lives. Accordingly, the manner in which divorces are
conducted in specific cases may have far reaching effect on the lives of the couple’s children. It
seems, therefore, that the best interest of the children must be one of the factors influencing the
shape of divorce laws. Thus, even those who do not believe that a strict and all-embracing policy
regarding achieving a divorce will inure to the benefit of the child, would agree that the divorce
procedure ought to be shaped in a manner which takes into account the impact of the divorce on
the children in the concrete case. Consequently, different treatment ought to be accorded to
divorces which involve children and divorces which do not involve children. Where the divorces
do not involve children, the divorces must focus on the parents, their desires and needs. In
contrast, when the process involves a couple with children, a divorce procedure must be
established which also takes into account the best interest of those children. This may have a
number of practical legal ramifications which go beyond the prevailing legal order in most
western countries:
First, conceivably it is necessary to establish default options which distinguish between the
length of a divorce process which does not involve children and the length of a divorce process
which involves children. At least as a starting premise, it would seem that the existence of
children is a consideration for establishing a lengthier divorce process both in order to exhaust
the possibility of compromise between the parents and in order to enable the family to properly
prepare and plan their divorce.
Second, I believe that in the case of divorce which involves minors, it is right to enable the
courts to make the divorce contingent upon a referral to professionals or to special Unit which
92
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operates within the Family Court, which will enable the couple and the family as a whole to
prepare and plan their future actions. Moreover, against the background of the significant
ramifications of divorce upon children, we may ask the court dealing with children to obtain a
report from a professional regarding the expected impact of the divorce process upon the
children and even demand that the children or their independent representative be heard prior to
the divorce.
Finally, beyond the ordinary rules dealing with the divorce process, the court must be vested
with the power to delay or propel forward the divorce process in a specific case, while taking
into account the opinions of professionals and its evaluation of the needs of the couple’s
children.
In this context, I wish to re-emphasize that according to our analysis considerations relating to
children cannot entirely prevent divorce or even defer them for a prolonged period of time. At
the same time, considerations of the best interest of the child may make the concrete divorce
process compatible with the needs of the children of the family. It seems to me that even if the
price of such compatibility is certain harm to the right to exit of the person seeking the divorce,
the modern ethos which is committed to the best interest of the child may justify such harm,
provided always that such harm is temporary.
Against the backdrop of my recommendations regarding the situation which ought to prevail, an
examination of the actual legal situation is largely disappointing:
On one hand, in many western countries, such as the countries of Scandinavia,93 Australia94 and
some of the states in the United States,95 there is a clear tendency towards expressly or impliedly
93
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adopting a special divorce model based on demand. As I have shown this model is not
sufficiently sensitive to the needs of children. On the other hand, a large proportion of the
proposals for reform of family law seek to make divorce laws in their entirety more stringent or
even return to fault based models of divorce. First, a large proportion of these proposals ensue
from moral and/or religious motivation regarding the institution of marriage and they do not
focus on the best interest of the children. Second, even when the motivation of the persons
making the proposals is the best interest of the children, I do not believe that making the divorce
laws more stringent is the right solution. Indeed, as I fully explained previously, the best interest
of children does not necessarily require the prevention of divorce and certainly it does not justify
the discourse of fault.
Against the background of my criticism both against the modern trend towards the model of
divorce on demand and against the approaches which seek to make the divorce process as a
whole more stringent for the sake of the welfare of the children, I wish to note favourably the
Family Law Act which was adopted in England at the end of the last century.96 In certain aspects
the new Act integrates with the previous trends towards easing the laws of divorce: the new Act
completely repeals the grounds of fault, and the sole ground for divorce is a declaration by one or
both parties that the marital connection has broken down.97 In other words, the system is one of
“no fault” which enables “official” unilateral divorces.
At the same time, the Act illustrates the legal possibility of taking into account the best interest
of children:
First, in the spirit of our recommendation, the Act distinguishes between a divorce in which
minor children are involved and one in which children are not involved.98
Second, the Act determines that all matters connected with the custody of children must be
resolved prior to a divorce order being given.99

divorce at all without the consent of the innocent party, and accordingly it is not possible to characterize these states
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Third, the Act empowers the court to prevent a divorce in the event that it would result in serious
hardship to the children of the couple.100
As noted, the premise of the Act is that a divorce process in which children are involved will last
longer. At the same time, the Act is aware of cases where this is contra-indicated and therefore
provides that when the best interest of the child compels a swift divorce process, it is possible to
bring forward the time of divorce.
It cannot be denied that part of the motivation for enacting the Act was connected to a
fundamental trend towards strengthening the institution of marriage.101 In addition, in England
doubt has been expressed regarding the ability to implement the Act in practice and indeed the
implementation of the Act has been deferred for the time being, and according to a government
announcement it is possible that it will be amended prior to being implemented.102 Nonetheless, I
believe that this Act and the processes preceding it make it clear that western law has not yet said
the last word on the laws of divorce and at least from the perspective of the best interest of the
child it seems that this is a correct process.

ii

Property Relationship: the Rights of Children in the Family Property

The economic relations between couples also illustrates the modern trend towards distinguishing
between spousal relations and parenthood and joint parenthood and the difficulties posed by this
distinction from a point of view which focuses on the best interest of the child.
In the prevailing legal discourse, children’s maintenance is perceived as a child’s right,
notwithstanding that in practice payment of maintenance is made to the parent and not directly to
the child, it is perceived to be part of the laws of parenthood. In contrast, the duty to maintain a
spouse and property rules are perceived to be part of spousal law.
However, in the real world the distinction is less sharp:
First, the non-custodial parent does not pay the financial support directly to the child but to the
custodial parent and in practice besides the needs of the child the financial means of both parents
are an important factor in the calculation of the precise sum that the non custodial parent has to
pay. This means that the economic connection and even dependency between the spouses
continue. The continuing ties and dependency dramatically weaken the clean break aspirations of
spousal law.103
More important is the fact that the economic relations between the couple are not entirely
spousal in nature, as the economic state of the custodial parent has a dramatic influence on the
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interests of children and the quality of their lives.104 Thus, for example, studies show that
notwithstanding the tendency of property law in the western world to share the joint property of
the couple equally, in many cases female custodians encounter economic problems in the
aftermath of divorce.105 In view of the fact that in the majority of divorce disputes it is the
women who struggle as the custodians of the children, it is no wonder that studies show that the
economic situation of the parent who holds the child following divorce, is one of the factors
which has the greatest influence on the negative phenomena experienced by children of divorced
families.106
Naturally, the economic condition of the custodial parent derives not only from the sum he
receives for child maintenance but also and perhaps primarily from the economic spousal
regulation between the parties, i.e., the property relations and the obligation to pay maintenance
to the other spouse. Consequently, the property arrangements and the economic support of the
spouse which are customarily regarded in legal thinking as spousal issues, have clear influence
on the welfare of children. Accordingly, I believe that expansion of the obligatory duty of the
father to maintain his children cannot suffice, it would be right to consider a reform of the
property laws aimed at safeguarding the economic and psychological state of the children of
divorced families.
Reforms of this type are likely to justify departing from an equal distribution of the property of
the parties, in favour of the spouse holding the children in order to ensure the welfare of the
children of the family. It is also possible to think of a more radical change which would allow
some of the family property to be transferred into the names of the children or at least for a short
period of time to charge some of the family property in favour of the children of the family.
Contrary to the position I have espoused here, it seems that in recent years many western
countries, including most of the states of the United States, have developed a different trend.
Following this trend, even common law countries have tended to adopt the tradition of the
countries of the civil law in which family property is perceived as a product of partnership
between spouses. This perception tends to prefer a stringent partnership rule which divides the
products of the partners between the partners, i.e., between the spouses. This rule makes it much
more difficult to depart from equal distribution generally and accordingly makes it more difficult
to vest extra portions of the property in the custodial parent.107 Certainly, the attitude to a
104
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partnership in which the sole partners are the parents makes it difficult to directly vest property
rights in the children of the family.
Against the background of my criticism of legal systems which are committed to strict equal
distribution, there is a clear advantage to equitable legal systems which enable the courts to
depart from equal distribution for various reasons. Particularly noteworthy are legal systems
which like the English Property law refer to the best interest of children as a specific factor
which dictates the economic consequences of the divorce.108
In this regard I wish to emphasize that the legal literature reflects an intense dispute concerning
the advantages and disadvantages of equitable legal systems versus legal systems favouring strict
equal distribution.109 Indeed, in many cases equitable legal systems undermine legal stability.110
Moreover, empirical studies show that in many cases, equitable legal systems have led to the
diminution of the share of women in spousal property and not the opposite.111 Naturally, an
inequitable distribution in which custodial women receive less than half of the spousal property
harms children. In practice, even in England in which, as we have seen, the welfare of the child,
is a formal criterion in terms of the division of property, a practice has developed in which
women receive only a third of the spousal property. However, even if in the prevailing situation,
equitable distribution harms women, in my opinion, it is possible to conceive of an additional
reform which will relate to equal distribution as a stringent default option and which will enable
a deviation from this type of division in favour of the custodial parent only, and only when this
deviation is required for the benefit of the couple’s children.
The possibility of vesting children with direct rights in the family property is even more
problematic from the property point of view. Nonetheless, at least in some western states there
are statutory provisions and judgments which vest this power. I believe that from the vantage
point of the benefit of the child extensive use of these provisions should be encouraged.112
So far I have referred to the need to integrate children related considerations into property law in
those situations in which divorcing couples have minor children. Now I wish to argue that the
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original design of the property laws must also take into account the ramifications these laws have
for the willingness of the couple to make decisions for the benefit of their children even when
these decisions prima facie harm them personally. Thus, for example, property laws which do
not take into account the loss of career of the domestic spouse may prevent couples from
reducing their work hours in order to devote time to being with their children even when such a
decision is needed for the benefit of the children. Against this background I believe that the
considerations of the best interest of the child support establishing property arrangements which
will enable the parties to live lifestyles which take into account the good and benefit of their
children.113 Accordingly, I believe that considerations of the benefit of the child require the
establishment of mechanisms which will compensate the spouse who took care of the children
for his loss of career during the marriage and/or even vest him with a portion of the human
capital which his spouse accumulated during the marriage. More precisely, in recent years there
have been those who justified the establishment of such mechanisms and at least some have been
adopted in various countries. Nonetheless, in the present discourse, the justification for these
mechanisms is based on the relationship between the couple and on their interests. In contrast, in
my opinion, beyond the regular spousal justifications it is also possible to justify these
mechanisms from a broader public point of view which seeks to enable and encourage
comfortable conditions for children to grow. Accordingly, it should be noted that ironically these
type of child related considerations should be implemented even if, at the time of divorce, the
children of the couple have already become adults, as property laws which do not care for a
spouse who sacrificed his personal interests for his children is likely to cause hardship in the
future to the children of other couples.
Thus, in my opinion, a proper regulation of property law must distinguish between three separate
situations:
1. Couples without children – in such a case, the legal regulation will be based solely on the
interests of the couple and accordingly in most cases the private individual ideology
currently guiding spousal law will continue to be compatible.
2. Couples with small children at the time of divorce – in this case, regulating the property
relations must take into account the needs of the minor children. A matter which may
justify both deviation from equal distribution in favour of the custodial parent and direct
registration of the property in the names of the children.
3. Couples who together raised children who have since become adult – in this case the
legal regulation will focus on the couple. At the same time, the regulation must take into
account the public interest in encouraging or at least in enabling parents to devote time to
their children. Accordingly, beyond the regular considerations raised by the laws of
property there is room to compensate the spouse who devoted most of his time to raising
the children as their primary care-taker.
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In this connection it is important to admit that the recognition of property rights of children in
family property is contrary to customary property thinking and in many senses it impairs the
individual rights of the parents. At the same time, I believe that modern law recognizes, in
numerous contexts, the economic and non-economic limitations which parental relations impose
on the parent. Thus, for example, Article 27(2) of the Convention provides that:
“The parent(s) or others responsible for the child have the primary responsibility to
secure, within their abilities and financial capacities, the conditions of living necessary
for the child’s development.”
Accordingly, I am of the opinion that in certain cases it is also right to protect the rights of
children using property or quasi-property measures and that the accepted distinction between the
obligatory right of children to maintenance and property relations which deal with property
issues, is not sacred. In any event, it is clear to me that the issue of property relations again
illustrates the need to find new balancing formulae between the needs of children and the rights
of parents, an issue which will be discussed in the last paragraph of this section.

iii

Accommodation

The difficulty alluded to in the previous section, concerning the division of the economic
relations between those attributable to the spousal relations and those relating to the interests of
the children, manifest itself in the context of the family living accommodation. On one hand, on
the property level, in the vast majority of cases the residential home is the property of both
spouses or a single spouse. Accordingly, this is apparently a spousal issue. However, the
definition of ownership of the residential home, and even more so decisions regarding severing
the partnership in the apartment by selling it, may have dramatic ramifications for the lives of
their children, who concurrently with the divorce will also be forced to relinquish a familiar
place of residence. Indeed, psychological studies of divorce show that one of the ramifications of
divorce is the harm to the sense of stability of the children of the couple. Part of the impairment
to stability is connected to the family change within the framework of which daily contact with
the two parents is terminated. An additional aspect of instability is connected to the fact that in
many cases, one of the ramifications of divorce is a change in the place of residence as a result of
the sale of the residence pursuant to the distribution of assets between the parents.114
Accordingly, notwithstanding the natural classification of the issue as a spousal matter, one
cannot ignore its ramifications for the quality of life of the children.
Does the existing legal situation enable the prevention of the sale and distribution of the
residential home in order to ensure stability in the lives of the children?
According to standard legal thinking, the parent’s obligation to provide economic support for his
children naturally includes the need to ensure their accommodation. This obligation is commonly
perceived as a general obligation which does not require the parents to continue enabling their
children to live in the residential home to which they are accustomed. Nonetheless, in a wide
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variety of contexts sale of a residence ultimately also leads to an overall change of place of
residence, as often, with only half the money received from the sale of the original flat, the
custodial parent will find it difficult to finance a flat in the same area and consequently will be
forced to seek a more modest flat or, alternatively, a similar size flat in a cheaper area. The
change in accommodation and in the area of residence aggravates the psychological difficulty
involved in divorce. Accordingly, I believe, that an approach focusing on the welfare of the child
is likely to support conferring discretion on the court to draw a division between the ownership
of property and occupation of the flat and enable the custodial parent to continue living in the
residential home. Notwithstanding that such an arrangement undermines the property rights of
the non-custodial parent it seems to me that this is one of the cases where considerations of the
welfare of the child supersede the private, individual nature of existing spousal laws. At the same
time, in order to limit the harm to the non-custodial spouse, I propose that the right of residence
in the family home be granted unconditionally to the custodial parent only for the duration of an
acclimatization period, and longer periods will only be granted in special cases in which patent
harm would be caused to the children by requiring them to transfer. Further, I believe that
consideration should be given to the economic harm caused to the non-custodial spouse when
calculating maintenance payments for the children or when arranging the overall property
relations between the parents.
Like other issues considered above, there is a divergence between our proposals and the
prevailing legal situation, and in many western countries severing the partnership in the
residential home is perceived to be part of the property arrangements between the parents. Thus,
for example, in Israel up to 1995, it was possible to obtain a speedy court order requiring the
partnership in the residential home to be dissolved, without examining alternative
accommodation options for the children of the family. In 1995 the law was amended and now a
court ordering the dissolution of the partnership must examine whether alternative
accommodation arrangements are available for the children. At the same time, as I mentioned,
even the amending law is satisfied with the existence of temporary alternative accommodation
and only very few judges are sensitive to children’s need to continue living in the family home to
which they are accustomed.
Against this criticism, it is important to point to a number of countries which have developed
legal arrangements in the proper direction: in this spirit it was decided in England, and even in a
number of states in the United States, that the custodial parent must be vested with
accommodation rights in the residential home of the couple, even after the divorce, such rights to
be unconnected to property rights.115 The case law in England is not uniform in implementing
this provision or setting the balance between the needs of the children and the rights of the
parents.116 At the same time, it seems to me that despite the disputes, the section and the case law
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dealing with it provide a good example of a legal arrangement which seeks to overcome the
formal classifications and also consider the interests of children in the context of spousal laws. A
similar arrangement which seeks to enable children to continue residing in the family home
exists also in Canada. Thus, the Family Law Act – 24, provides that the court is entitled to grant
the sole right of occupation to one of the spouses even if he is not the owner of the property.
Section 24.3 provides parameters which the court must weigh before granting exclusive
occupation. The primary criterion is:
(a) the best interests of the children affected;
Section 24.4 provides criteria for examining the best interest of the child:
[What is best for the children is a major consideration in determining whether to grant a spouse
exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.]
(a) the possible disruptive effects on the child of a move to other accommodation; and
(b) the child’s views and preferences, if they can reasonably be ascertained.

iv.

Agreements and Representations

Another ramification of the modern division between regulating parenthood and regulating the
spousal connection is connected to the legal attitude to agreements between the spouses / parents.
According to modern thinking, where reference is to issues classified as spousal, i.e., the
property relations between spouses and their economic responsibilities, it is necessary to aspire
to apply liberal principles of freedom of contract. In contrast, in so far as reference is to
agreements dealing with children, such as support of children and custody of children, more
stringent public oversight must be exercised over the agreements. In this spirit, it is stated even in
modern laws which reveal a clear trend towards broadening legal enforcement of premarital
agreements and divorce settlements, that agreements dealing with the custody of children or
agreements that impair children’s rights to support, will not be enforced according to regular
criteria.117
Nonetheless, the analysis made in the previous sections makes it clear that even issues classified
as spousal, such as the property relations between the spouses, may have an impact of the
welfare of children. Accordingly, I am of the opinion that the logic justifying subordinating the
parents’ freedom of contract to the principle of the welfare of the child may also justify
intervention in agreements between parents which prima facie deal with spousal issues. Against
this background, I believe that the qualifications to freedom of contract in the family context
must be drafted broadly in such a way as to clarify that every arrangement which might harm

children. The order prevented the father from taking his share in the home which was his sole property. The Appeals
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children is subject to review by the court even if formally the agreement deals with spousal laws,
such as the ownership of property and methods of realizing it.
Therefore I prefer the provisions drafted in Australian118 and Canadian119 statutes which enables
the court to intervene in every matter relating to children, over more focused formulations which
relate to issues of maintenance and custody.120
Yet, even the broader formulation will not help if the courts will not acknowledge that property
relations, accommodation and occasionally even the divorce itself are matters which concern
children and allow them to intervene in the content of these agreements on grounds of children’s
welfare.
A similar implementation of my approach relates to the issue of the representation of children. In
recent years an approach has developed holding that when a dispute arises between the parents,
the interests and the needs of the children may be forgotten and accordingly the court dealing
with the interests of children must ensure that the children obtain independent representation
during litigation or, alternatively, when processes get underway to achieve an agreed settlement.
According to customary legal thinking, independent representation of minors is obtained in the
context of parent-child relations. In contrast, under our analysis, it would also be right to enable
independent representation in much wider contexts such as in the contexts of divorce, property
and accommodation.
So far I have dealt with situations in which recognition of the lack of a clear distinction between
spousal law and parent-child law supports strengthening public oversight of family agreements
and the litigation between spouses. I now wish to present the contrary situation where it is
actually recognition of the interconnection between these fields which may broaden freedom of
contract in the family context. I am referring here to the often seen situation in which, during
family negotiations, the spousal issues and the parental issues are not perceived as independent
issues by the negotiators. Accordingly, the divorce settlement is discussed as a whole concept
where interests conceded in the spousal arena are weighed against interests conceded in the
parental arena and vice versa.121
In many senses, this state of affairs is problematic from a perspective which focuses on the
welfare of the child as there is a fear that parents will “sacrifice” the interests of their children for
personal gain.122 Particular fear arises in situations where there is a significant discrepancy in the
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level of power of the respective spouses. In this situation the spouse with greater economic
power might exploit the weakness of the other spouse in order to evade his obligations not only
towards that other spouse but also towards the children. Against this background, it would seem
that it is actually the point of view focusing on the welfare of the child which should favor a
strict separation between the regulation of spousal relations and consensual relations, where the
concession of children’s interests by their parents will be invalid.
However, in my opinion, there are situations in which arrangements which integrate spousal
issues with parenting issues are in the interest of children. The property concession of a home is
also of great value from a perspective focusing on the welfare of the child. Think, for example,
of a spouse willing to give up his share in the matrimonial home registered in the name of the
custodial parent in consideration for a reduction in the amount of the maintenance payments
which he is required to pay to his child. A strict division between the regulation of parenthood
and the regulation of spousal relations may lead to the outcome whereby the reduction in the
amount of the maintenance payments to the children will not be valid notwithstanding the
property concession. Accordingly, spouses may be deterred from making agreements of this
type. On the other hand, the analysis made in the previous chapters teaches that this type of
arrangement will provide the children with stability and security and therefore it integrates well
with the interest in the welfare of the children. Accordingly, I am of the opinion, that it is
reasonable to engage in an overall examination of the arrangement without completely, and in
my opinion artificially, severing the spousal components and the parental components. In cases
where the court is persuaded that the agreement as a whole is a fair agreement which answers the
needs of the children, it must confirm the agreement as a whole and not look at each component
individually.
In view of this stance, I believe that the trend existing in some western states to distinguish, in an
extreme manner, between the obligation to pay maintenance to children which is calculated
independently by administrative authorities123 and the other economic matters which the court
considers, makes it more arduous to achieve comprehensive agreements and consequently is a
problematic trend. Accordingly, I recommend that even when technical formulae exist for
calculating the minimum amount of child maintenance, ways must be found to enable a deviation
from these formulae, where in consideration for the reduction of maintenance payments to the
child, the child or even the custodial parent receives a more generous share of the matrimonial
property.

V. Conclusion: Toward new Balance between spousal rights and parental
responsibility
In this study I have tried to examine the complex relations between the regulation of spousal
relations and the regulation of parenthood. In the first stage I analysed the differences in the
development of the two areas and the manner in which this development led the drafters of the
law to try and distinguish between them in a stringent manner. I explained why different aspects
of this distinction are important from a perspective which focuses on the welfare of the child.
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Against this line of thought, I pointed to cases in which the distinction is incompatible with the
way in which families live and operate and how it may even undermine the welfare of the child.
There are two levels at which this study may be read:
At one level the study does not refute the actual distinction between spousal regulation and
parental regulation but only indicates the cases where various issues classified today as spousal
law possess a parental aspect. According to this line of thought, the importance of the study lies
in the renewed delineation of the boundary between the spousal laws and parenthood laws while
clarifying that different issues of accommodation, property and even divorce have an impact on
parent-child relations and therefore are subject to the best interest of the child.
At the same time, in my opinion, the study has an additional broader significance related to the
actual ability to sever spousal relations and parental relations: in the prevailing legal discourse,
there is a dichotomy between matters concerning children, in which the best interest of the child
is the primary consideration or even the exclusive consideration and other matters in which the
welfare of the child is not expressed in legal terms. Nonetheless, this analysis - which shows that
even manifestly spousal matters, such as divorce laws, property relations between spouses and
accommodation in the matrimonial home have an impact on the welfare of children - proves the
problematic nature of the dichotomy. On one hand, the classification of these issues as matters
connected to children and their complete subordination to the principle of the welfare of the child
is unreasonable as it disregards the rights and needs of the parents on these issues. On the other
hand, refusal to regard them as issues concerning children leads to the complete and
inappropriate removal of child related considerations from the treatment of these issues. Against
this background I believe that the great challenge facing the drafters of family law is to chart
intermediate categories of family law which will deal both with spousal relations and with
parental aspects and to try to propose appropriate balancing formulae which integrate the
interests, wishes and rights of all those concerned in these issues.
This leads me to a final insight: While western culture predominantly focuses on individualistic
rights, there are certain areas of law, such as children-parents law in which responsibilities,
duties and obligation remain central notions. One possible strategy employed by lawmakers is to
isolate these animalist areas of law, distinguishing them from the primary legal focus on
individuals. This Article suggests a different approach, by integrating conceptions of
responsibility into the liberal-Individual areas of law. The example of children and spousal law
demonstrates the significant advantages of the letter approach.
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